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Abstract
Landau, Reid, and Yershov [A Fair Division Solution to the Problem of Redistricting, Social
Choice and Welfare, 2008] propose a protocol for drawing legislative districts based on a two
player fair division process, where each player is entitled to draw the districts for a portion
of the state. We call this the LRY protocol. Landau and Su [Fair Division and Redistricting,
arXiv:1402.0862, 2014] propose a measure of the fairness of a state’s districts called the geometric
target. In this paper we prove that the number of districts a party can win under the LRY
protocol can be at most two fewer than their geometric target, assuming no geometric constraints
on the districts, and provide examples to prove this bound is tight. We also show that if the
LRY protocol is applied on a state with geometric constraints, the result can be arbitrarily far
from the geometric target.
1 Introduction
Gerrymandering is the act of drawing legislative districts to favor one group over another. The
focus of this paper is one of the most prevalent forms of gerrymandering, Partisan Gerrymandering,
where a political party draws districts to favor their party over opposing parties. Gerrymandering
has recently been the focus of a number of high-profile court cases, and has drawn the interest of
many mathematicians, some of whom have provided expertise in court. For example, the work of
Herschlag, Ravier, and Mattingly in [2] was used in a recent United States supreme court case, while
Pegden [5] testified in front of the Pennsylvania supreme court about the Pennsylvania congressional
map.
Mathematicians have attempted to create metrics that detect intentional gerrymandering. In
[1], Duchin discusses some of the approaches used and challenges faced in developing a metric for
detection of gerrymandering. In [7], Warrington analyzes and compares numerous metrics that have
been created for detecting gerrymandering, such as the Efficiency Gap. In this paper we consider a
measure of fairness called the geometric target, proposed by Landau and Su in [4]. The geometric
target is defined as the average of the best and worst cases for a party’s measure of success. We
discuss the geometric target in more detail in Section 2.4.
Fair division is the question of how to divide an object or set of objects among parties so that
all parties receive a portion that is considered fair by their own evaluation. An example of a fair
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division problem is the classic I cut you choose protocol for two-person cake cutting, which is envy-
free in that each person gets a piece that they value as at least half the total of the cake. Finding
a fair protocol for redistricting of states can be thought of as a fair division problem. For example,
Pegden, Procaccia, and Yu in [6] analyze an I cut you freeze protocol for districting and provide
guarantees for number of districts with majority support for a given party and the ability to pack a
given sub-population into districts.
The fair division protocol we analyze in this paper, which we refer to as the LRY protocol, is a
two-player discrete fair-division procedure for districting described by Landau, Reid, and Yershov in
[3]. In the LRY protocol the two parties are presented with a sequence of splits of a given state, and
asked to submit preferences for which side of the split they would prefer to draw the districts, with
the other party getting to draw districts on the other side. In the end, a split is chosen and one party
draws the districts on one side, and the other party draws the districts on the other. In Section 2
we fully explain this protocol using our notation. In Theorem 2.16, we show that if there are no
geometric constraints on how the district is drawn, the number of districts won by a party under the
LRY protocol can differ from that party’s geometric target by at most 2 and from a party’s k-split
geometric target (a variation of the geometric target which is meaningful for the LRY protocol) by
at most 32 .
In Section 3 we consider the case where there are geometric constraints on how districts may
be drawn. We define some geometric constraints corresponding to contiguity and compactness. In
this case, we show in Example 3.1 that it is possible to create a situation where the LRY protocol
can return a result for a party where the number of districts they win is arbitrarily far from their
geometric target.
2 The LRY Protocol with no geometric constraints
The LRY protocol was described by Landau, Reid, and Yershov in [3]. Here we summarize the
protocol in our notation.
2.1 Notation for parties, support and splits
We suppose there are two parties, denoted A and B. We will use P to denote a generic party,
P ∈ {A,B} and P to denote the party opposing P . The goal of the protocol is to draw districts
for a state, and we use n ∈ N to represent the number of districts to be drawn in the state, where
each district contains the same number of people. For a party P , let xP denote the total support of
player P in the state, and we assume xA + xB = n, so since there are n districts, the support of the
parties in each district is normalized to sum to 1.
For 0 ≤ k ≤ n define a k-split to be a division of the state so that on one side of the split (by
convention, we call this the left side) the two parties’ support sums to k, i.e. there are k districts’
worth of population on the left side of the k-split, and n− k districts’ worth on the right side. For
a k-split, let Lk denote the area on the left of the split, and Rk denote the area on the right. We
denote by S a side S ∈ {L,R}. Given a k-split, Let Sk denote the area on the specified side of the
k-split, and Sk denote the area on the other side.
Call a sequence of k-splits, 0 ≤ k ≤ n nested if for every k ≥ 1, Lk−1 ⊆ Lk. For any nested
sequence of k-splits, denote by xP (Sk) the total support for party P in Sk, and let xP (k) = xP (Lk)−
xP (Lk−1), i.e. xP (k) is the support for party P between the (k− 1)-split and the k-split. Note that
for all k, xA(k) + xB(k) = 1. Refer to Figure 4 in [4] for an example of a state with nested 1-, 2-, 3-,
and 4-splits.
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We assume that whichever candidate has more support in a district will win the district, and we
adopt the convention that for all k, xP (Sk) is not an integer multiple of .5. Therefore, we assume a
party can always win a district with a strict majority, and there is no need to consider tied districts.
2.2 The LRY Protocol
In the LRY protocol, an administrator (someone not affiliated with either party) presents a sequence
of nested k-splits.
For all k, each party indicates which of the following options they prefer:
Option 1: Party A districts Lk and Party B districts Rk
Option 2: Party B districts Lk and Party A districts Rk
A party may also indicate that they are indifferent to the two options.
The outcome of the protocol is as follows:
Outcome 1: If there exists some k such that Parties A and B both prefer the same option,
then a map is created using that assignment of areas to district.
Outcome 2: Else if there is a k such that one party is indifferent but the other is not, the
preferences of the non-indifferent party are chosen.
Outcome 3: Else if there exists a k such that both parties are indifferent then one of Option
1 and Option 2 is randomly chosen for that k.
Outcome 4 (Coin flip scenario): Else it must be the case that there exists a k such that
for the (k− 1)-split Party A prefers Option 2 and Party B prefers Option 1 but for the k-split
they switch their preferences (Note that both parties prefer to district the right side in a 0-split
and the left side in an n-split). We call this scenario the coin flip scenario. In this case, the
protocol randomly returns one of the following four options, which we call the coin flip options :
• Option 1 for the (k − 1)-split
• Option 2 for the (k − 1)-split
• Option 1 for the k-split
• Option 2 for the k-split.
In this section, we assume there are no geometric constraints on district lines, so when districting
a side, a party is free to distribute their support among the districts in any way they like. The
following example (illustrated in Figure 1) shows a situation where a coin flip scenario might arise.
Example 2.1. Suppose there is a state with 10 districts, and the following levels of support for the
5- and 6- splits. Let
• xA(L5) = 1.9, xB(L5) = 3.1
• xA(6) = 0.9, xB(6) = 0.1
• xA(R6) = 1.4, xB(R6) = 2.6.
We suppose each party’s goal is to maximize the number of districts they win. We examine the
possible options for the 5- and 6- splits in Example 2.1.
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xA(L5) = 1.9
xB(L5) = 3.1
xA(6) = .9
xB(6) = .1
xA(R6) = 1.4
xB(R6) = 2.6
5-split 6-splitL5 R6
Figure 1: An example where the coin flip scenario applies.
• 5-split, Option 1: With support 1.9, A can claim a majority in 3 districts on the left, leaving 2
for B, while with support 2.7, B can win all 5 districts on the right. So A wins 3 and B wins
7.
• 5-split, Option 2: With support 2.3, A can claim a majority in 4 districts on the right, leaving
1 for B, while with support 3.1, B can win all 5 districts on the left. So A wins 4 and B wins
6.
• 6-split, Option 1: With support 2.8, A can claim a majority in 5 districts on the left, leaving 1
for B, while with support 2.6, B can win all 4 districts on the right. So A wins 5 and B wins
5.
• 6-split, Option 2: With support 1.4, A can claim a majority in 2 districts on the right, leaving
2 for B, while with support 3.2, B can win all 6 districts on the left. So A wins 2 and B wins
8.
Thus A prefers Option 2 and B prefers Option 1 for the 5-split and they switch preferences for the
6-split.
A voting model is a prediction of how the people in the state will vote, and of course in the real
world, each party may have their own private voting model. It is interesting to note that if both
parties share the same voting model, then in the LRY protocol parties with the goal of maximizing
districts won will always choose different options or be indifferent to the options for a given k-split.
It is likely in the real world that two parties would not have the same voting model or have different
goals (e.g. protecting incumbents), so in that case it is possible the LRY protocol could return
Outcomes 1 or 2.
2.3 Optimal Strategies
Throughout the paper, we assume that the goal of each party is to maximize the number of districts
they win. In this section, we assume there are no geometric constraints on how parties may draw
district lines other than those imposed by the k-splits in the protocol. Given these assumptions, we
now describe optimal strategies for each player, and state precisely how many districts they can win
given their support.
Define Pi(Sk, Pj) to be the number of districts won by party Pi on side Sk when party Pj draws
districts on Sk. For example A(L7, B) is the number of districts that party A will win among the 7
districts in L7 when B draws the districts on that side. Let P (Sk) be the total number of wins for
P when they district Sk and P districts Sk. That is,
P (Sk) = P (Sk, P ) + P (Sk, P ).
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Since the number of districts in the state is the sum of the districts won by both parties,
P (Sk) + P (Sk) = n.
Let |Sk| be the number of districts in Sk, i.e. |Lk| = k and |Rk| = n− k.
Proposition 2.2 describes the number of districts a party can win when they draw district lines
on one side of a k-split, and Corollary 2.4 describes how many districts P will win if their opponent
draws the districts on one side of a k-split. Informally, if a player has a majority on the side where
they are drawing districts, their best strategy is to divide their support evenly in each district, thus
having a majority in each one. If they have a minority, they should win as many districts as possible
with just over .5 of their support in each district. In all propositions, we state the result in terms of
a party P , but to make the proofs more readable, since the protocol is symmetric, we will frequently
assume without loss of generality that P = A in the proofs.
Proposition 2.2. P (Sk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Sk)⌋, |Sk|}.
Proof. There are two cases, depending whether party P has a majority on side Sk or not.
Case 1: Suppose xP (Sk) >
|Sk|
2 , and thus |Sk| = min{⌊2xP (Sk)⌋, |Sk|}. In this case, player P
can create |Sk| districts where in each district their support is xP (Sk)|Sk| > 12 . Thus they can win |Sk|
districts, and this is the best possible.
Case 2: Suppose xP (Sk) <
|Sk|
2 , and thus ⌊2xP (Sk)⌋ = min{⌊2xP (Sk)⌋, |Sk|}. For any district
i to be a victory for P the support for P in the district must be at least 1/2. Thus player P can
create ⌊2xP (Sk)⌋ districts with support just over 0.5, and can win these districts, but their remaining
support is less than .5, so they cannot win any more.
Before proving Corollary 2.4, we need to prove a property of floors and ceilings.
Proposition 2.3. Assume x, y ∈ R and x+ y = k with k ∈ N. Then
min{⌊2x⌋, k}+max{⌈y − x⌉, 0} = k.
Proof. Since y = k − x,
min{⌊2x⌋, k}+max{⌈y − x⌉, 0} = min{⌊2x⌋, k}+max{⌈k − 2x⌉, 0}.
Case 1: Assume x > k2 . Then
min{⌊2x⌋, k}+max{⌈k − 2x⌉, 0} = k + 0 = k.
Case 2: Assume x ≤ k2 . Then
min{⌊2x⌋, k}+max{⌈k − 2x⌉, 0} = ⌊2x⌋+ ⌈k − 2x⌉ = ⌊2x⌋+ k + ⌈−2x⌉.
Since ⌈−z⌉ = −⌊z⌋ for all z ∈ R, this quantity is equal to ⌊2x⌋+ k − ⌊2x⌋ = k.
Corollary 2.4. P (Sk, P ) = max {⌈xP (Sk)− xP (Sk)⌉, 0}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume P = A. Since xA(Sk) + xB(Sk) = |Sk| and |Sk| ∈ N, by
Lemma 2.3 it follows that
min{⌊2xB(Sk)⌋, |Sk|}+max {⌈xA(Sk)− xB(Sk)⌉, 0} = |Sk|.
Additionally,
|Sk| = B(Sk, B) +A(Sk, B).
By Proposition 2.2, B(Sk, B) = min{⌊2xB(Sk)⌋, |Sk|}, so
A(Sk, B) = max {⌈xA(Sk)− xB(Sk)⌉, 0} .
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2.4 The Geometric Target
The geometric target provides a measure of fairness for a districting protocol [4]. The geometric
target for a party P , denoted geo(P ) is the average of a party’s best case scenario and worst
case scenario. Since we assume each party’s goal is to maximize the number of districts won, this
corresponds to the average of the number of districts a party wins when they district the whole state
and the number of districts a party wins when the opposing party districts the whole state.
When discussing the LRY protocol, it is also useful to define for each k the k-split geometric
target for a party P , denoted geok(P ). This quantity is the average of a party’s best case scenario
and worst case scenario, with the restriction that every district must lie on one side or the other of
the k-split.
In Propositions 2.6 and 2.7 we give formulas for the geometric target and k-split geometric targets
in terms of a party’s support. Then in Proposition 2.8 we show that the geometric target cannot
differ from any k-split geometric target by more than 1/2 for any value of k. To do this, we need a
result about differences between floors and ceilings.
Proposition 2.5. Let r and s be positive real numbers, and t = r + s. Then
i. |⌈t⌉ − (⌈r⌉+ ⌈s⌉)| ≤ 1 ,
ii. |⌈t⌉ − (⌈r⌉+ ⌊s⌋)| ≤ 1,
iii. |⌊t⌋ − (⌈r⌉+ ⌊s⌋)| ≤ 1,
iv. |⌊t⌋ − (⌊r⌋+ ⌊s⌋)| ≤ 1.
Proof. Parts i. and ii. follow from the observations that
⌈r⌉+ ⌈s⌉ ≥ ⌈r + s⌉,
⌈r + s⌉ ≥ ⌈r⌉+ ⌊s⌋, and
(⌈r⌉+ ⌈s⌉)− (⌈r⌉+ ⌊s⌋)| ≤ 1.
Similarly, Parts iii. and iv. follow from the observations that
⌊r⌋+ ⌊s⌋ ≤ ⌊r + s⌋,
⌊r + s⌋ ≤ ⌈r⌉+ ⌊s⌋, and
(⌈r⌉+ ⌊s⌋)− (⌊r⌋+ ⌊s⌋)| ≤ 1.
Proposition 2.6. If xP > n/2, then geo(P ) =
⌈2(xP )⌉
2 . If xP < n/2, then geo(P ) =
⌊2xP ⌋
2 .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume P = A. In both cases, the party A will win the most
districts when it draws all districts, and will win the fewest when B draws all the districts. Thus,
by Propositions 2.2 and 2.4, when xP > n/2,
geo(A) =
A(Ln) +A(L0)
2
=
n+ ⌈xA − xB⌉
2
=
n+ ⌈xA − (n− xA)⌉
2
=
⌈2(xA)⌉
2
.
Similarly, when xP < n/2,
geo(A) =
A(Ln) +A(L0)
2
=
⌊2xA⌋+ 0
2
=
⌊2xA⌋
2
.
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Proposition 2.7. For any k, geok(P ) =
P (Lk)+P (Rk)
2 .
Proof. The party P will win the most districts when it draws districts on both sides of the k-split,
and will win the fewest when P draws districts on both sides of the k-split. Thus, for any k- split,
geok(P ) =
P (Lk, P ) + P (Rk, P ) + P (Lk, P ) + P (Rk, P )
2
=
P (Lk, P ) + P (Rk, P ) + P (Lk, P ) + P (Rk, P )
2
=
P (Lk) + P (Rk)
2
.
Proposition 2.8. For all k, | geo(P )− geok(P )| ≤ 12 .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume P = A. There are 4 cases, depending whether A has a
majority of the support in the state, and on each side of the k-split. Without loss of generality, we
assume that if A has a majority of support on one side of the k-split and a minority of support on
the other side, that it has a majority on the left. We explain the first case in detail, and sketch the
rest.
Case 1: Assume A has a majority of support in the state, and on each side of the k split,
i.e. xA >
n
2 , xA(Lk) >
k
2 , and xA(Rk) >
n−k
2 . Then, using Proposition 2.7, Proposition 2.2 and
Corollary 2.4,
geok(A) =
A(Lk) +A(Rk)
2
=
A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B) +A(Lk, B) +A(Rk, A)
2
=
k + ⌈xA(Lk)− xB(Lk)⌉+ ⌈xA(Rk)− xB(Rk)⌉+ (n− k)
2
=
k + ⌈2xA(Lk)− k⌉+ ⌈2xA(Rk)− (n− k)⌉+ (n− k)
2
=
⌈2xA(Lk)⌉+ ⌈2xA(Rk)⌉
2
.
By Lemma 2.6, geo(A) = ⌈2(xA)⌉2 . Thus,
| geo(A)− geok(A)| =
∣
∣
∣
∣
⌈2xA⌉
2
− ⌈2xA(Lk)⌉+ ⌈2xA(Rk)⌉
2
∣
∣
∣
∣
.
Since xA(Lk) + xA(Rk) = xA, Proposition 2.5 Part i. implies this quantity is at most 1/2.
Case 2: Assume xA >
n
2 , xA(Lk) >
k
2 and xA(Rk) <
n−k
2 . Then
geok(A) =
⌈2xA(Lk)⌉+ ⌊2xA(Rk)⌋
2
and geo(A) =
⌈2(xA)⌉
2
.
Case 3: Assume xA <
n
2 , xA(Lk) >
k
2 and xA(Rk) <
n−k
2 . Then
geok(A) =
⌈2xA(Lk)⌉+ ⌊2xA(Rk)⌋
2
and geo(A) =
⌊2xA⌋
2
.
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Case 4: Assume xA <
n
2 , xA(Lk) <
k
2 and xA(Rk) <
n−k
2 . Then
geok(A) =
⌊2xA(Lk)⌋+ ⌊2xA(Rk)⌋
2
and geo(A) =
⌊2xA⌋
2
.
In Cases 2, 3, and 4, the conclusion follows from Proposition 2.5, Parts ii., iii., and iv., respectively.
2.5 Analyzing the fairness of the LRY Protocol
In this section, we prove that the number of districts a party wins under the LRY protocol is within
two of its geometric target. Proposition 2.7 states that the k-split geometric target for a party P is
the average of the number of districts won by P under Options 1 and 2 in the protocol. Thus in at
least one of these options the number of districts won by P is at least the k-split geometric target.
This is what is referred to as the “Good Choice Property” in [3] and [4]. Thus if the protocol ends
in outcomes 1, 2, or 3, the number of districts won by P will be at least its k-split geometric target,
and thus by Proposition 2.8, within 1/2 of the geometric target. Thus we devote the rest of the
subsection to analyzing Outcome 4, the coin flip scenario.
Before we prove the theorem, we finish analyzing the coin flip scenario in Example 2.1. Analyzing
the 5- and 6-splits with Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.4, we get
A(R5, A) = 4, A(R5, B) = 0, A(L5, A) = 3, A(L5, B) = 0,
A(R6, A) = 2, A(R6, B) = 0, A(L6, A) = 5, A(L6, B) = 0.
Thus A(R5) = 4, A(L5) = 3, A(R6) = 2, and A(L6) = 5. Proposition 2.7 implies geo5(A) =
geo6(A) = 3.5, and since xA = 4.3, by Proposition 2.6, geo(A) =
1
2⌊2 · 4.3⌋ = 4.
Note that in this example in one of the coin flip options, (A(R6)), A wins only 2 districts, while
the geometric target is 4. Thus the protocol gives A two fewer districts than is fair as defined by
the geometric target, and 1.5 fewer than the k-split geometric target. The goal of this subsection is
to show that this is the farthest possible outcome from either target.
For the remainder of the section, assume we have a fixed sequence of k-splits in a given state.
Before considering the coin flip scenario, we first prove some results on the possible differences in
the number of districts won for consecutive k-splits.
Proposition 2.9. Suppose xP (k) < .5. Then 0 ≤ P (Lk, P )− P (Lk−1, P ) ≤ 1
Proof. Note that P (Lk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Lk)⌋, k} = min{⌊2xP (Lk−1) + 2xP (k)⌋, k − 1 + 1}. Thus
P (Lk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Lk−1) + 2xP (k)⌋, k − 1 + 1} ≥ min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)⌋, k − 1} = P (Lk−1, P ),
and
P (Lk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)+2xP (k)⌋, k−1+1} ≤ min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)⌋, k−1}+1 = P (Lk−1, P )+1,
justifying the first and second inequalities, respectively.
Proposition 2.10. Suppose xP (k) > .5. Then 1 ≤ P (Lk, P )− P (Lk−1, P ) ≤ 2
Proof. Note that P (Lk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Lk)⌋, k} = min{⌊2xP (Lk−1) + 2xP (k)⌋, k − 1 + 1}. Thus
P (Lk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)+2xP (k)⌋, k−1+1} ≥ min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)⌋, k−1}+1 = P (Lk−1, P )+1,
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and
P (Lk, P ) = min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)+2xP (k)⌋, k−1+1} ≤ min{⌊2xP (Lk−1)⌋, k−1}+2 = P (Lk−1, P )+2,
justifying the first and second inequalities, respectively.
Proposition 2.11. Suppose xP (k) < .5. Then 0 ≤ P (Rk, P )− P (Rk−1, P ) ≤ 1
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume P = A. Since xA(k) < .5, xB(k) > .5. Interchanging
the roles of A and B and left and right sides (note Rk−1 has one more district in it that Rk),
Proposition 2.10 implies
1 ≤ B(Rk−1, B)−B(Rk, B) ≤ 2.
Since A(Rk−1, B) = n− k + 1−B(Rk−1, B), and A(Rk, B) = n− k −B(Rk, B),
A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B) = n− k −B(Rk, B)− (n− k + 1−B(Rk−1, B))
= B(Rk−1, B)−B(Rk, B)− 1.
Thus 0 ≤ A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B) ≤ 1.
Proposition 2.12. Suppose xP (k) > .5. Then −1 ≤ P (Rk, P )− P (Rk−1, P ) ≤ 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume P = A. Since xA(k) > .5, xB(k) < .5. Interchanging
the roles of A and B and left and right sides (note Rk−1 has one more district in it that Rk),
Proposition 2.9 implies
0 ≤ B(Rk−1, B)−B(Rk, B) ≤ 1.
Since A(Rk−1, B) = n− k + 1−B(Rk−1, B), and A(Rk, B) = n− k −B(Rk, B),
A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B) = n− k −B(Rk, B)− (n− k + 1−B(Rk−1, B))
= B(Rk−1, B)−B(Rk, B)− 1.
Thus −1 ≤ A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B) ≤ 0.
Lemma 2.13. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, P (Lk−1) ≤ P (Lk) ≤ P (Lk−1) + 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume P = A. Suppose xA(k) > 0.5. Then, using Proposi-
tions 2.10 and 2.12,
A(Lk) = A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B)
= A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B) + (A(Lk−1, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk−1, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + (A(Lk, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
≥ A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + 1− 1
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B)
= A(Lk−1).
Also using Propositions 2.10 and 2.12,
A(Lk) = A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B)
= A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B) + (A(Lk−1, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk−1, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + (A(Lk, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
≤ A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + 2 + 0
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + 2
= A(Lk−1) + 2.
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Suppose xA(k) < 0.5. Then, using Propositions 2.9 and 2.11,
A(Lk) = A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B)
= A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B) + (A(Lk−1, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk−1, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + (A(Lk, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
≥ A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + 0− 0
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B)
= A(Lk−1).
Also, using Propositions 2.9 and 2.11,
A(Lk) = A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B)
= A(Lk, A) +A(Rk, B) + (A(Lk−1, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk−1, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + (A(Lk, A)−A(Lk−1, A)) + (A(Rk, B)−A(Rk−1, B))
≤ A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + 1 + 1
= A(Lk−1, A) +A(Rk−1, B) + 2
= A(Lk−1) + 2.
Interchanging the roles of the left and right sides in Lemma 2.13, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.14. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, P (Rk) ≤ P (Rk−1) ≤ P (Rk) + 2.
We now analyze the coin-flip scenario. If the protocol ends with Outcome 4, using the (k − 1)-
and k-splits, then party P must prefer to district one side for the (k− 1)-split, and the other for the
k-split. If P (Lk−1) > P (Rk−1) and P (Lk) < P (Rk), then by Corollary 2.14 and Proposition 2.13,
P (Rk) ≤ P (Rk−1) < P (Lk−1) ≤ P (Lk) < P (Rk),
a contradiction. Thus for the remainder of the section we assume for both parties, P (Lk−1) <
P (Rk−1) and P (Lk) > P (Rk).
In Proposition 2.15, we show that the largest difference between any two outcomes in the coin
flip scenario is at most three wins.
Proposition 2.15. In a coin flip scenario involving a (k− 1)- and k-split, P (Rk−1)−P (Lk−1) ≤ 3
and P (Lk)− P (Rk) ≤ 3.
Proof. By the properties of the coin flip, Lemma 2.13, and Corollary 2.14
P (Rk−1)− P (Lk−1) ≤ P (Rk−1)− P (Lk) + 2
< P (Rk−1)− P (Rk) + 2
≤ 2 + 2
= 4
Similarly,
P (Lk)− P (Rk) ≤ P (Lk−1) + 2− P (Rk)
< P (Rk−1)− P (Rk) + 2
≤ 2 + 2
= 4
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Since P (Rk−1) − P (Lk−1) and P (Lk) − P (Rk) are each integers less than 4, they can be at most
3.
We now prove the main theorem. Example 2.1 shows that both bounds in the theorem are tight.
Theorem 2.16. Suppose the LRY protocol ends in a coin flip scenario involving a (k − 1)- and
k-split. Then for all S ∈ {L,R} and i ∈ {k − 1, k},
1. | geoi(P )− P (Si)| ≤ 32 , and
2. | geo(P )− P (Si)| ≤ 2.
Proof. To prove Part 1, use Propositions 2.7 and 2.15, and the fact that Si is Li or Ri:
|P (Si)− geoi(P )| =
∣
∣
∣
∣
P (Si)− P (Li) + P (Ri)
2
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
P (Li)− P (Ri)
2
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤ 3
2
.
For Part 2, by the triangle inequality and Proposition 2.8,
| geo(P )− P (Si)| = | geo(P ) + geoi(P )− geoi(P )− P (Si)|
≤ | geoi(P )− P (Si)|+ | geo(P )− geoi(P )|
≤ 3
2
+
1
2
= 2.
3 The LRY Protocol with Geometric Constraints
We now show that given some geometric constraints on the district shape, it is possible under the
LRY protocol for a party to win a number of districts that is arbitrarily far from their geometric
target.
First we define our geometric constraints. Our state is an m×m square grid, where each square
represents an indivisible area of population. Denote by d ∈ N the number of squares that constitutes
the population of one district. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, let ai,j denote the fraction of support for party A
in the square in the ith row and jth column. By convention, we draw the first row at the top, and
first column at the left, and when context is clear, we will abuse notation and use ai,j to represent
the square itself.
Our geometric constraints on districts are that they must be contiguous and compact. For
contiguity, we require a district must be simply connected, and for compactness, we require that
each district fits inside a z by z square, where z = ⌊2
√
d⌋.
Example 3.1. Let ∆ ∈ N, m = 20∆ and d = 100, so there are 400∆2 squares and 4∆2 districts,
each of which has 100 unit squares and must fit in a 20× 20 square. Let ai,j = 1 if it meets one of
the following conditions
1. i ≡ 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 mod 20 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 10,
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L1 . . .
L2 \ L1 . . .
. . . . . .
L∆ \ L∆−1
. . .
. . .
Figure 2: An illustration of part of the state in Example 3.1. Each large square corresponds to a
20× 20 piece of the grid. The shaded areas correspond to the groups of 51 squares where Party A
has support 1 in each small square. The support for Party A in the rest of the state is 0. The areas
Li \ Li−1 for i = 1, 2, and ∆ are outlined with thick lines.
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2. i ≡ 6 mod 20 and j = 1,
and let ai,j = 0 otherwise. See Figure 2 for a partial drawing of the state.
The total support for Party A in Example 3.1 is 51∆. Since each district contains 100 squares,
the support for A in each square is either 1 or 0, and the squares are indivisible, the best possible
outcome for Party A is to win ∆ districts. This is in fact possible: For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ∆, if a district
contains all squares with nonzero support for party A in rows 1 + 20(ℓ − 1) through 20ℓ then the
support of A in that district is 51. Thus by drawing ∆ such districts, and dividing the rest of the
state arbitrarily, A can win ∆ districts. It is also possible to draw districts so that A will win none,
and thus the geometric target for A is ∆/2.
The key observation about Example 3.1 is that A can only win a district if that district contains
all of the 1’s in 20 consecutive rows in the first 10 columns. We now discuss the result of the LRY
protocol on Example 3.1, where the splits will be chosen to break up these groups. For 0 ≤ k ≤ 4∆2,
we specify the nested k-splits by describing for 1 ≤ k ≤ 4∆2 the area that is in Lk \ Lk−1, i.e. the
area in Lk that is not in Lk−1. It is important to notice that these are not vertical k-splits like the
ones in Figure 1. For 1 ≤ k ≤ ∆− 1, let
Lk \ Lk−1 = {ai,j : 1 + 20(k − 1) ≤ i ≤ 20k, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5},
and let
L∆ \ L∆−1 = {ai,j : 1 + 20(∆− 1) ≤ i ≤ 10 + 20(∆− 1), 1 ≤ j ≤ 10}.
The key observation is that for 1 ≤ k ≤ ∆− 1, A(Lk) = 0 and A(Rk) = ∆− k > 0, and A(L∆) = 1
and A(R∆) = 0. Thus, regardless of the structure of the rest of the k-splits, if k > ∆, A(Lk) ≥ 1
and A(Rk) = 0, so we do not specify these splits explicitly. Note that for all of these splits,
B(Sk) = 4∆
2 −A(Sk).
With these k-splits, for 0 ≤ k ≤ ∆−1, both parties prefer to district Rk, while for ∆ ≤ k ≤ 4∆2,
both parties prefer to district Lk. Thus the LRY protocol returns a coin flip scenario with the
(∆− 1)- and ∆-splits. Note A(L∆−1) = 0, A(R∆−1) = 1, A(L∆) = 1, and A(R∆) = 0. Thus two of
the coin flip options are ∆/2 less than geo(A).
Example 3.1 implies the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Under the LRY protocol with geometric constraints, the number of districts won by
a party can be arbitrarily far from the geometric target.
We note that Example 3.1 relies on a highly structured pattern for a party’s support, and k-splits
that divide that pattern in a specific way. Landau and Su [4] note that by doing the LRY protocol
repeatedly with many different patterns of k-splits, one is unlikely to have one party at a persistent
disadvantage relative to their geometric target.
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